It is possible to study the reception of Aristotle's natural philosophy by means of the various tools that were used by intellectuals during the thirteenth century. This type of literature is often forgotten. Four samples are taken here to illustrate the interest of such works, and the information that we can extract from them. The examples are the sermons by Anton of Padua ; an encyclopedia composed by Arnold of Saxony during the second quarter of the thirteenth century, which includes (...) extracts from recent translations mixed together with Neoplatonic passages; an Aristotelian florilegium, which illustrates thirteenth-century censorship of Aristotelian texts; and a translation of the Meteorologica into the vernacular, which documents the popularity of this treatise at the end of the thirteenth century and the creation of a technical vocabulary in old French texts. The third example is an anthology that originated in a Franciscan milieu and was compiled in its definitive form at the end of the 13th century. This latter presents a series of purged texts about natural science. Finally, it discuss the French translation of Aristotle's Meteorology by Mahieu le Vilain, master at the Arts Faculty of the University of Paris at the end of the 13th century. This is the first translation of an Aristotelian treatise into vernacular, allowing us to understand the popularization of this treatise and its importance for the technical vocabulary of this discipline. (shrink)

La notion de kairos, entendue au sens de « moment opportun », liée à celle de metron — notion dont l'auteur a déjà montré l'importance dans la littérature grecque antique dans son ensemble - intervient de mille manières dans les écrits d'Aristote sur les sciences de la nature. Elle y apparaît sous la forme des catégories temporelles pas-encore ou trop-tôt, et jamais-plus, ou trop-tard. A preuve, différents textes tirés des Météorologiques, de la Génération des animaux, des Parties des animaux et (...) même de la Politique. De ce point de vue, Aristote peut être considéré comme un précurseur de la science moderne. The notion of kairos, understood in its meaning of « opportune moment », combined to that of metron — a notion whose the Author has already shown the importance in ancient Greek literature as a whole -is present in numerous ways in Aristotle's works on the sciences of nature, where it appears under the form of the temporal categories of not yet or too early, and never again or too late. This is confirmed by various selected texts from the Aristotelian works Meteorológica, On the Generation of Animals, On the Parts of Animals and even from the Politics. From this point of view Aristotle may be considered as a forerunner of modern science. (shrink)

Biophilia is a concept that has been much utilized as a foundation for an environmental or “land” ethic. E.O. Wilson characterizes it as a genetic disposition that links human survival to valuing living systems. J. Baird Callicott argues that human sentiments are naturally directed to all living systems and beings and this sentiment has evolutionary value. This author contends that if biophilia is to be a viable foundation for such an ethic, it must be conceived more abstractly and broadly as (...) an interconnecting feature of biotic systems. The foundation for such a conception can be found in Aristotle’s ethics, wherein his discussion of friendship, philia, can provide a theory of interspecies obligation. Although Aristotle’s focus in the Nicomachean Ethics is human relations, he makes it clear that this sentiment can be felt towards other living beings. This paper develops a broader conception of philia that includes interspecies relationships and then reconceives the modern concept of biophilia as a form of interspecies philia. It goes on to argue, using Aristotle’s theory of obligation as reciprocity within friendship, that such a re-conception of biophilia might provide another approach to founding an environmental ethic on a theory of sentiment. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of the application of democraticand anti-racist educational principles in a college setting.The paper explores both the implications of pedagogical theoryfor anti-racism and the implications of anti-racism forpedagogy. After giving a brief description of the conditionsencountered in an economically and intellectually impoverishedregion of the country, the paper outlines an application ofJohn Dewey's educational theory to college instruction.Then, after an account of what racism is, the paper reappliesDewey's model to the teaching of anti-racism, and with thehelp of (...) Paulo Freire's theory of educational praxis,readapts Deweyan principles to the task of reconstructingour classrooms as models of anti-racist communities. (shrink)

English summary: The fifth book of Aristotles Metaphysics is presented here in a new French translation with analysis of the books structure and considerable commentary and overview of the significance and often difficult meaning of this essential text. French description: On s'est beaucoup interroge sur le cinquieme livre de la Metaphysique, qui se presente sous la forme de trente notices consacrees a l'etude des differentes significations ou usages de certains termes, dont les raisons du choix n'apparaissent pas d'emblee. Le present (...) travail met en evidence la maniere dont le livre s'integre a l'enquete proprement metaphysique d'Aristote, par l'analyse de ces termes de toute premiere importance philosophique, trop generaux pour etre etudies par une science particuliere, mais indispensables a la connaissance de n'importe quel domaine de l'etre. Une traduction inedite, qui degage la structure du texte, un commentaire approfondi et une synthese originale des significations distinguees permettent une approche nouvelle de ce document celebre. Les auteurs esperent ainsi a la fois faciliter la lecture et la comprehension du texte, et fournir en outre aux specialistes de nombreuses suggestions d'interpretation de passages controverses ou obscurs. (shrink)

Dans la Politique, Aristote s’attache à distinguer, pour les articuler et les hiérarchiser, la sphère économique et la sphère politique. Tout en reconnaissant l’autonomie propre des activités économiques, il s’attache à exposer les motifs qui légitiment la limitation de celles-ci par le pouvoir politique. En consacrant l’éminence de la politique par rapport à la sphère marchande, Aristote manifeste l’impérieuse nécessité de subordonner la recherche et l’acquisition des biens et des richesses matérielles – légitimes dans leur ordre – aux activités les (...) plus hautes de l’homme qui, seules, sont susceptibles de lui procurer le bonheur véritable. Recherchées pour elles-mêmes, celles-ci sont l’expression d’une sortie par l’homme d’une logique de l’utilité et témoignent d’une forme authentique de liberté dans laquelle se déploient sa vertu et son excellence. C’est in fine uniquement une éducation à la vie de loisir qui fait advenir, dans la communauté, des individus susceptibles d’assumer la destination morale et politique à laquelle la cité est appelée. Classification JEL : B11. (shrink)

Daniel Mansuy | : L’article que nous présentons est une analyse de la lecture que fait Leo Strauss du passage où Aristote distingue entre la justice naturelle et la justice positive. Tout en voulant s’écarter des interprétations thomiste et marsilienne, Strauss suggère une position paradoxale qui, tout en admettant qu’il y a un droit naturel, rejette l’existence des principes de justice immuables. Notre thèse est que l’interprétation de Strauss n’est pas complètement fidèle au texte d’Aristote, et présente en fait sa (...) propre position comme étant aristotélicienne. | : The article we are submitting intends to analyze the interpretation proposed by Leo Strauss of the passage in which Aristotle makes the distinction between Natural Justice and Positive Justice. While attempting to distance himself from Thomist and Marsilius-based interpretations, Strauss suggests a paradoxical position which, while admitting natural right, rejects the existence of principles of immutable justice. Our thesis is that Strauss’s interpretation is not faithful to Aristotle’s text and that he actually presents his own position as if it were Aristotelian. (shrink)

Plusieurs aspects de la métaphysique, de la physique, de l'éthique et de la psychologie d’Aristote peuvent s'interpréter comme des affleurements d'un concept non-thématisé, celui d'être-dans-le-monde (l'in-der-welt-sein de heidegger). L’ensemble de la pensée grecque classique, même si elle était fascinée par l'ordre du cosmos, ne s'est guère demande ce que signifiait "être-dans-le-monde". L’expérience de la facticité, qui est un des traits fondamentaux de celle-ci, est ce qui permet à Aristote dans le protreptique, de justifier la vie philosophique ; mais il conçoit (...) celle-ci comme culminant dans la contemplation, c'est-à-dire l'accès a ce qui est au plus haut point (ch. 2). Aristote est toujours resté pris dans cette ambiguïté, qui provient de ladite transposition : son éthique révèle ses hésitations entre deux sujets de l'agir moral : le "je" à qui il incombe d'agir de par ce qu'il a d'unique, le cédé a l'homme, tel qu'il est défini par sa place parmi les autres parties de l'univers (ch. 3 & 4). Par suite, il lui faut définir l'homme comme le plus mondain des êtres sublunaires : l'homme imite l'univers grâce à son universalité, et parce qu'il est capable de saisir les réalités les plus élevées (ch. 5). Cependant, Aristote ne peut définir le topos - ce dans quoi sont les choses- sans renvoyer à notre façon particulière d'être-là, même s'il réintroduit ensuite l'idée d'univers grâce à sa théorie des dimensions du corps humain comme fondées dans la structure objective du cosmos (ch. 6). Les difficultés de la définition aristotélicienne de l'âme ainsi que celles de la doctrine de l'intellect agent proviennent de la tentative d'Aristote pour transposer ce qu'il pense implicitement comme l'ouverture même du monde à travers notre présence dans le registre de la réalité mondaine-ce qui l'oblige à réduire l'âme à la conscience de ce qui se produit parmi les choses du monde (ch. 7). Il conçoit celui-ci d'une manière telle qu'elle l'amène à exclure le mouvement spécifiquement humain au profit de la continuité absolue des corps célestes. Cependant, la contemplation de soi du premier moteur reflète l'ambiguïté non résolue de l'energeia humaine : le pur acte d'être-là et l'activité de contempler le plus haut de tous les êtres s'y fondent (ch. 8). Malgré tout, l'energeia comme concept ontologique fondamental ne peut pas se définir en dehors de l'expérience humaine de l'être-là (ch. 9). (shrink)

The problem of the Rota Aristotelis deals with the unrolling of two tightly connected concentric circles with different radii. It is to be found in Chapter 24 of the text Mechanica of the Aristotelian corpus (today generally no longer attributed to Aristotle) and has bothered many authors until the modern age. All these scholars agree that the solution given there is not satisfactory. We conclude that Chapter 24 is close to Aristotle, at least, both from a philological and philosophical (...) point of view. The solution of the problem given in the ancient text can very well be transferred into a modern physical phenomenological explanation. (shrink)

Ingram Bywater first published his edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in 1890. His reconstruction of the Greek text is based on a careful weighing of the Greek manuscript evidence, Latin translations, the witness of early commentators and his own thorough knowledge of Aristotle's language and style. Bywater's choice of readings introduced many important alterations to the text given in previous editions; his preference for manuscripts Kb and Lb and for the commentary of Aspasius, represented by Heylbut's edition, explains many of (...) these changes. Select readings of the most important witnesses are given in a critical apparatus. Bywater's edition has been widely used by scholars and students of the Greek text of Nicomachean Ethics and a number of important translations have been based on it. The edition's carefully compiled index of key Greek words, arranged according to usage, has proved an indispensable tool to generations of Greek students. (shrink)

What is the criterion for distinguishing between the excellence of the excellent constitution κατ’ εὐχήν in Politics VII and the excellence of the other excellent constitutions? Every constitution includes in its composition necessity and good. Yet, unlike what happens in the other excellent constitutions, in the best constitution of Politics VII there is a convergence, not an opposition, between necessity and goodness. This point is confirmed by a change in the meaning of the word ἀναγκαῖον. In the constitution delineated in (...) Book VII, ultimately matter and form are identical. Both the convergence between necessity and good and the fact that every citizen should be a good man or a ‘maker of virtue’ lead to equate the excellent constitution with the completed form of political capacity. Hence, the relationship between πολιτεία and ἀρίστη πολιτεία is similar to the relationship between ἔργον κιθαριστοῦ and ἔργον σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ. (shrink)

This paper aims at investigating Aristotle’s criticism of Plato on the practical good. It confronts the practical functions attributed to the Idea of the good in Plato’s Republic to Aristotle’s objections against this Idea in the Ethics, objections that point out its practical inefficiency. Then I turn to Aristotle’s own elaboration of the practical good, showing how indebted it is to the treatment of the human good in the Philebus. This leads to assess how and how far Aristotle distances himself (...) from Plato’s views on the practical good. (shrink)

Aristotle’s observation that “Plato not wrongly ordered sophistry around non-being” (Metaph. E 2, 1026b14; also in K 8, 1064b29) refers generally to Plato’s Sophist. The admission of non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) could be considered as a certain consequence of the Eleatic monism, which gave rise to the Sophistic movement as has been recognized by Plato and Aristotle. In this paper, we try to identify more precisely the context of this setting of non-being of polemical and very particular importance.

Aristotle says at the start of the De interpretatione that words symbolise thoughts, which are in turn likenesses of things. The present paper argues that he is speaking here primarily of the signification of whole sentences, and at most secondarily of the semantics of individual words. This proposal is defended by drawing attention to a shift in the meaning of ‘sign’ and cognate terms that occurs in the course of the first chapter, one which enables us to separate the way (...) in which words ‘signify’ thoughts (declarative, interrogative, etc.), by expres­sing them, from the more narrowly semantic way in which, subsequently, they are said to signify things. Aristotle’s famous opening state­ment finds its main application, not in the rudimentary grammar of nouns and verbs that follows in chapters 2-3, but later in the treatise, and above all in chapter 14, where it is invoked to establish for dialectical purposes that the relation between a sentence and its negation is the strongest of all contrarieties. Aristotle’s insis­tence, in this same treatise, on the conventional character of language is also explained: for in chapters 8 and 11 it is because of the conventionality of language, and its consequent failure to map systemati­cally onto the divisions between things, that what is in surface grammar a single sentence may turn out to be in reality two or more sentences, in other words, to signify (i.e. express) two or more different thoughts. Aristotle’s primary focus on the meanings of entire sentences is thus explained by the role of the De interpretatione as a work ancillary to dia­lectic, a discipline for which the relation between contradictory pairs of assertions is fundamen­tal. In addition, such a focus is argued (with a comparison to the Stoic lekton) to reflect Aris­totle’s teleological frame of thought. (shrink)

The tripartite division of peoples described in chapter 7 of book VII of Aristotle’s Politics identifies natural-born Greeks as the only people capable of free and well-ordered living in the polis. Ought we to infer from this passage that the underlying asymmetry between Greeks and non-Greeks somehow corresponds to the distinction, found in book I, between those who are masters by nature and those who are slaves by nature? The aim of this paper is to show that this claim is (...) not only not self-evident, but that it runs counter to Aristotle’s non-providential finalism, which is incompatible with the notion that nature could favor one people to the detriment of all others. In other words, the Greek people is not the rightful heir of the order of the world to the extent that their natural superiority in the political realm is quite accidental. (shrink)

Radulphus Brito's Quaestiones super Priora analytica Aristotelis is a major work written in the early 1300s which treated Aristotle's text devoted to the theory of the syllogism. Brito, one of the most influential of the group of medieval thinkers known as the Modistae, examines both categorical and hypothetical syllogisms. In the text offered here, based on six known manuscripts which are complete or nearly complete, Brito was critical of many of the theories of his contemporary, Simon of Faversham. Brito (...) edited his work several times; there are at least two versions which indicate Brito returned to this material during his long career at the university in Paris. This volume is the first critical text edition of Brito's Quaestiones super Priora analytica Aristotelis and will therefore be of great interest to those studying the history of logic and its development during the medieval period. (shrink)

Nous pouvons tous, je crois, reconnaître la justesse de la thèse d'Aristote à l'effet que le véritable raisonnement pratique a pour résultat non pas une simple croyance à propos du caractère désirable, ou même du caractère obligatoire, d'un acte, mais plutôt l'initiation effective d'une action. Cette thèse donne lieu à une énigme : comment la délibération, archétypiquement une inférence propositionnelle rationnelle , peut-elle logiquement aboutir à un acte ? L'action présuppose la motivation, mais la motivation est une force appétitive active, (...) et non pas une proposition concernant le désir ou le caractère désirable d'un acte . La raison pratique n'est pas similaire aux substances qui peuvent manifestement être mélangées les unes aux autres, mais elle est censée constituer une fusion normative régie par des principes — le choix est un appétit délibéré , comme le dit Aristote. Comment ceci est-il possible ? Les premiers pas vers une réponse peuvent être trouvés à un endroit surprenant : chez Kant. Dans la Métaphysique des Moeurs , Kant présente une théorie du désir comme appétit pour un objet par le biais d'une idée non-sensorielle de cet objet, et ce, par opposition à une inclination , un appétit direct basé sur la sensation. Kant emploie cette notion du désir pour expliquer à la fois la volonté et la possibilité d'une action accomplie par devoir : la volonté appartient à la faculté de désirer, et le devoir est l'action motivée par un désir pour un acte par le biais d'une idée appropriée de cet acte. Kant nomme notre susceptibilité à ce type de désir laquelle constitue une condition nécessaire à la moralité le sentiment moral . Ce sentiment rend compte du caractère pratique de la délibération morale et de son rapport au plaisir et à la douleur pratiques d'une façon qui aurait, je crois, plu à Aristote. Le devoir est donc un exemple d'un appétit délibératif . Ce schème kantien n'est pas simplement intéressant d'un point de vue historique : il s'accorde remarquablement bien avec certains travaux récents en psychologie motivationnelle et hédonique.We all can, I think, appreciate the justness of Aristotle's view that genuine practical reasoning ends not in a mere belief about the desirability, or even obligatoriness, of an act, but in the actual initiation of action. This yields a puzzle: how can deliberation, archetypically a rational, propositional inference , logically terminate in an act? Action presupposes motivation, yet motivation is an active appetitive force, not a proposition about desire or desirability . Unlike substances can obviously be mixed together, but practical reason is supposed to a principled, normative fusing — choice is deliberated appetite , as Aristotle puts it. How is this possible? The beginnings of an answer can be found in a surprising place: Kant. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant gives a theory of desire as appetite for an object through a non-sensory idea of it, in contrast to inclination , a sensation-based direct appetite. Kant uses this notion of desire to explain both will and the possibility of action from duty : will belongs to the faculty of desire, and duty is action motivated by a desire for an act through an appropriate idea. Kant terms our susceptibility to this sort of desire moral feeling , a necessary condition for morality. It accounts for the practicality of moral deliberation, and its linkage to practical pleasure and pain, in a way Aristotle would, I think, have found congenial. Duty, then, is an example of deliberated appetite . The Kantian scheme is not merely of historical interest: it fits surprisingly well with recent work in motivational and hedonic psychology. (shrink)

The article shows that Thomas Aquinas in many of his works interprets the passage Aristot. Metaph. II 1, 993 19‑31, as expounding a theory of degrees of truth and of being, which is not the true Aristotelian doctrine. This is due to the fact that he interprets ≪the eternal things≫, mentioned by Aristotle in that passage, as the heavenly bodies, and their principles as the unmoved movers, while Aristotle is speaking of the eternal truths, i.e. the truths of scientific knowledge, (...) and of their principles, which are the axioms. The origin of Thomas’ interpretation is the commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias, which Thomas knew via Averroes. (shrink)

Analysis and critical study of all the occurrences of ousia in Aristotle's Physics.

English summary: What was the intellectual dialogue between Aristotle and Plato that drove the formers concepts of ethics? This volume seeks to establish the background debate of Aristotle with his former teacher, one often depicted as adversarial but that created a dialectical character in which Aristotle built the cardinal notions of his ethical philosophy as responses to specific questions left open in Platos work. French description: Qu'Aristote ait lu Platon est de l'ordre de l'evidence. Cette evidence gagne neanmoins a etre (...) rappelee pour en degager toute la portee, plus particulierement dans le domaine de l'ethique ou le rapport d'Aristote a son maitre tend a etre reduit a la vision traditionnelle d'un disciple devenu un adversaire irreductible, et parfois injuste. Redonner voix au dialogue continu mais souterrain entre les ethiques des deux philosophes, en mettant au jour l'arriere-plan platonicien avec lequel Aristote est en debat, n'a pas pour seul but de reevaluer l'heritage platonicien du Stagirite. Une telle entreprise offre en meme temps une voie d'entree feconde dans l'elaboration de ses concepts ethiques, qu'il s'agisse du bonheur, du plaisir, de l'amitie ou de la sagesse pratique. En effet, faire l'hypothese qu'Aristote construit les notions cardinales de sa philosophie pratique comme des reponses precises a des questions non moins precises laissees ouvertes par les Dialogues permet d'en eclairer la genese et d'en degager les articulations constitutives. Bien loin d'etre un systeme statique de concepts, l'ethique aristotelicienne se trouve ainsi heriter du caractere dialectique plus volontiers attribue aux textes platoniciens qui enconstituent la toile de fond. La nouveaute comme la portee de l'intuition qui la guide, a savoir que le bien, pour les humains, reside dans l'action, s'apprecient mieux a l'aune de cette conversation continuee qu'elle entretient avec les questions et les prises de position de son predecesseur. (shrink)

Depuis 1926, la séparation chez Aristote a fait l'objet d'une vingtaine d'études qui, faut-il s'en surprendre, se contredisent les unes les autres. La question s'avère en effet d'une grande complexité, surtout en ce qui concerne la substance, et requiert par-dessus tout une approche systématique. Nous montrerons, d'abord qu'interpréter la séparation suivant une acception unique compromet la cohérence de la métaphysique aristotélicienne. Puis, une fois la pluralité admise, nous soutiendrons que la séparation par la notion et la séparation par le lieu (...) suffisent, malgré les objections qu'on y a faites, à expliquer la substance de manière satisfaisante. Since 1926, the separation in Aristotle's metaphysics gained enough attention to bring about twenty articles or so. Despite all those efforts, contradictions always emerge when they are confronted to each other. Separation, indeed, is a very difficult question, one particularly complex in relation to substance. This is precisely why a systematic approach must be undertaken. First, we will try to prove that a univocal interpretation of separation is inadequate. Then, we will argue that separation in notion and separation in place succeed, against some objections to be confronted, to generate an appropriate explanation of substance. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

Diese fünfbändige Aristoteles-Ausgabe in griechischer Sprache ist (mit Ausnahme von Bd III) ein fotomechanischer Nachdruck der maßgeblichen Aristoteles-Ausgabe von 1831-1870. Band I und II enthält die Werke Aristoteles. In Band III wird die durch O. Gigon besorgte Bearbeitung und Ergänzung der Fragmente des Aristoteles wiedergegeben. Band IV bietet eine Auswahl der bedeutendsten Stücke aus den antiken Kommentaren zu Aristoteles, sowie eine Konkordanz mit den Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. In Band V ist der Index Aristotelicus von H. Bonitz nachgedruckt.

This is the most noteworthy and, potentially, most fructifying Aristotelian study in recent decades. Unlike many other vues d'ensemble, it is neither a reconstruction of Aristotle's putative "development," nor an analytical rehabilitation of sedimented "doctrines"; rather, Brague's work is an engagement with the original evidence generating and sustaining Aristotle's discourses on the human, the worldly, and the divine. This engagement is carried through in a special register: Aristote et la question du monde is a surrogate for the book on Aristotle (...) Heidegger intended to write and for which Being and Time is the published substitute. The result is not a simplistic transcription of Aristotle into what often passes for Heideggerian jargon, but a thoroughly scholarly and philosophical reading of Aristotle from the "optic" of Being and Time. By examining many of the incises, the parenthetical cuts, into the corpus Aristotelicum, Brague summons our attention to what is important, not only "for Aristotle," but "in Aristotle". (shrink)

Quels sont les liens entre phantasia et perception? Aristote a bien découvert en la première, rattachée à la seconde, la faculté de se représenter en l'absence. Il y a certes des cas de représentation en présence imputés à la phantasia, mais cet emploi du terme, qui renvoie à des situations infraperceptives, est plutôt résiduel. Ces cas pathologiques sont pour Aristote assez peu dignes d'intérêt. On ne peut dire que la phantasia « interprète ». What is the link between phantasia and (...) perception? Although it depends on aisthêsis itself, Aristotle calls phantasia a faculty of representing in absentia, of which he is the discoverer. Of course, some cases of representation in praesentia are attributed to phantasia, but this use of the word is not central; these cases are cases below perception proper, and pathology of perception is of minor interest in Aristotle's mind. Phantasia is not an interpretation of the data. (shrink)

Aristote’s meson according to the Hölderlin’s Remarks on Sophocles The first two parts of the Remarks on Oedipus and later on Antigone (1804) form what Hölderlin calls a “point of contact” with an author : 1) Hegel ; 2) Aristote. The Naturphilosophie revisited by Hölderlin leads to elucidate very concretely the structure of the Sophocles tragedies : the “middle” — concept issued from the Poetics — is a “point of indifference” — concept issued from Schelling and Hegel’s “speculative physics”— between (...) the beginning and the end. The “caesura” (word of Tirésias), major discovery of Hölderlin, is structurally necessary as heterogeneous representation in Sophocles’ texts to bring to light the said middle, otherwise imperceptible. The Remarks, as analysed in the present article, disassemble the Poetics piece by piece to rebuild an extraordinary thought of the tragedy. Aristote would have sought to exceed, to really raise the moment of the “middle”, thus prefiguring the Hegelian dialectics. Yet Hölderlin will strongly oppose this suppression of meson. (shrink)

This article offers a general hypothesis on how Moerbeke’s translations of the Corpus Aristotelicum were disseminated at the University of Paris by means of exemplar and peciae. For each translation, two exemplaria appear to have circulated, one of which is older, of better quality, and more widely disseminated. It is argued that these original exemplaria are the ones mentioned in the 1304 list of exemplaria owned by the Paris University stationarius André de Sens. Moreover, it is not unlikely that some (...) of these original exemplaria were copied from Thomas Aquinas’ personal copy. The second exemplaria, on the other hand, which from a text critical point of view are related to the original ones, appear to be an attempt in the last decade of the thirteenth century to create a parallel dissemination of the translations in Paris. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die parallele Untersuchung der historischen Quellen zum oligarchischen Teilstaat von Eleusis nach dem Sturz der Dreißig legt nahe, dass der Vertrag unter anderem die Ordnung in Eigentumsfragen wiederherstellen sollte, nachdem die Häuser der zuvor ermordeten Eleusinier von Athenern willkürlich in Besitz genommen worden waren. Während bisherige Interpretationen der entsprechenden Klausel von der Annahme ausgehen, dass viele Eleusiner gezwungen waren, ihre Häuser zu verlassen, wird argumentiert, dass sie das Recht behielten, weiter in Eleusis zu wohnen. Das eingeführte Vermittlungsverfahren wird als (...) ein Indiz interpretiert, dass auch diese Maßnahme als Verhandlung mit dem Ziel der Versöhnung eingeführt wurde. (shrink)

Diese fünfbändige Aristoteles-Ausgabe in griechischer Sprache ist ein fotomechanischer Nachdruck der maßgeblichen Aristoteles-Ausgabe von 1831-1870. Band I und II enthält die Werke Aristoteles. In Band III wird die durch O. Gigon besorgte Bearbeitung und Ergänzung der Fragmente des Aristoteles wiedergegeben. Band IV bietet eine Auswahl der bedeutendsten Stücke aus den antiken Kommentaren zu Aristoteles, sowie eine Konkordanz mit den Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. In Band V ist der Index Aristotelicus von H. Bonitz nachgedruckt.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Spinoza: Une Lecture d'AristoteYitzhak MelamedFrédéric Manzini. Spinoza: Une Lecture d'Aristote. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009. Pp. 334. Paper, $39.95.The occasion that prompted the current study was the discovery of a tiny typo in the text of Spinoza's Cogitata Metaphysica—the appendix to his 1663 book, Descartes' Principle of Philosophy. As it turned out, this typo, a reference to Book XI instead of Book XII of Aristotle's Metaphysics, was (...) inadvertently reproduced by Spinoza from a contemporary edition of Aristotle's works, allowing Manzini to identify precisely the edition used by Spinoza as the 1548 edition of Aristotle's works printed in Basel by Johannes Oporinus. It also led him to conclude that, contrary to the belief of many, Spinoza read Aristotle's text very closely, and convinced him of the importance of studying the dialogue between the two great philosophers.The book is comprised of three parts, reversing the order of Spinoza's presentation of his philosophy in the Ethics. The first part discusses Spinoza's ethical and political theories—where, the author claims, the influence of Aristotle is most manifest—against the background of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. Here, much attention is given to the notions of the summum bonum and beatitude. The second part discusses Aristotelian and Spinozistic theories of knowledge. In the third and final part, dedicated to metaphysics and first philosophy, the author compares the philosophers' absolutely impersonal conceptions of God, examines their conceptions of substance, and develops a reading of what he calls Spinoza's "ousio-theology" (305).According to Manzini, Aristotle was one of Spinoza's first major philosophical interlocutors, and there is no doubt he is right about this. This conclusion, however, is unsurprising, [End Page 126] since seventeenth-century philosophers, whether devoted Aristotelians or determined anti-Aristotelians, conversed in an Aristotelian philosophical language. Manzini shows that Spinoza engaged directly with Aristotle's text, but also tries to substantiate an even stronger claim by stressing the agreements between the two philosophers.There are two reasons that make it difficult to see Spinoza as being consciously and positively influenced by Aristotle, however. First, Spinoza's dialogue with his philosophical predecessors is, without exception, highly critical and polemical. He does not usually mention philosophers with whom he agrees (e.g. Crescas and Machiavelli). Secondly, several of Spinoza's explicit references to Aristotle are highly critical. Consider, for example, Spinoza's claim, in a letter to Hugo Boxel, that "the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates carries little weight with me" (Letter 56), or his mockery of the "delusions of the Aristotelians and Platonists" (Theological Political Treatise [TTP], Pref.; cf. ch. 13). Manzini suggests that in these passages Spinoza is not so much addressing Aristotle, but rather using him as a foil to target medieval Aristotelianism (13). Looking closely at the context, my impression is that he is right about the passages in the TTP, but not about the quote from Letter 56. More importantly, the claim that Spinoza uses Aristotle's name as a foil is a double-edged sword that may also serve to undermine Manzini's argument. Throughout the book, Manzini points out interesting and significant similarities between Spinoza's and Aristotle's texts, but to establish direct positive influence one must consider and rule out mediating agents. In the present case there is plenty of evidence that Spinoza read medieval Hebrew Aristotelians closely. Unfortunately, most of the Hebrew authors mentioned by Spinoza were never translated into modern European languages, and there are very few, if any, good studies of Spinoza's dialogue with these texts; in the absence of such translations and studies, some of Manzini's conclusions must remain tentative.Manzini's erudition and analysis of the text are impressive. For example, near the end of his celebrated Letter on the Infinite, Spinoza criticizes "recent Peripatetics" for misunderstanding the ancient method of proving God's existence, citing Crescas's correct formulation of the ancient proof. Manzini rightly points out that the proof Spinoza ascribes to the "recent Peripatetics" was in fact Aristotle's, while the alleged "ancient" proof (which allows for actual infinity and relies on Avicennian... (shrink)

Comparaison entre la philosophie pratique aristotélisante d'aujourd'hui, représentée en Allemagne surtout par H.G. Gadamer, J. Ritter et leurs élèves, et les théories d'Aristote sur la phronesis et l'ethos, visant à montrer que ces dernières, dans la pensée du Stagirite, ne remplissent pas, contrairement à ce que croient ces interprètes, le rôle de la philosophie pratique toute entière. Contrast between the aristotelizing practical philosophy of today, represented in Germany especially by H.G. Gadamer, J. Ritter and their followers, and Aristotle's theories on (...) phronesis and ethos, in order to show that these theories, in the Stagirite's thought, don't play, against the opinion of those interpreters, the rôle of the whole practical philosophy. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

Les catégories dégagées par Aristote sont-elles un instrument formel, ontologiquement neutre, comme pourrait le laisser penser l'usage propédeutique qu'en firent les néoplatoniciens dans leur cursus scolaire? Si l'on refuse cette hypothèse, est-on contraint de donner aux catégories le statut d'êtres? L'opposition même entre interprétation ontologique et interprétation formelle devrait être remise en question, car une grille formelle, comme l'est le schéma des catégories, lorsqu'elle possède un ordre, comme c'est le cas avec les catégories, ne saurait être ontologiquement neutre. Are the (...) categories developed by Aristotle a formal, ontologically neutral instrument? The way they were used by the neo-Platonists in the foundation course of their school program would lead us to believe so. If we reject this hypothesis, are we then forced to give those categories the status of beings? The very opposition between ontological interpretation and formal interpretation should be questioned, since a formal grid such as the framework of the categories, possessing an order, as the categories do, could not be ontologically neutral. (shrink)

Whereas several zoological Aristotelian works have been preserved, Aristotle is reported to have written only one short botanical treatise. Such reports seem to conflict with his self-described ambition to study plants as well as animals. Even though this treatise is now lost, the available evidence suggests that Aristotle had valid reasons to find the subject-matter of plants much less interesting, as their activities amount to a subset of what animals do. When studying attributes common to both plants and animals in (...) the transmitted corpus, Aristotle systematically focuses on the case of the most complex animals and, once an explanatory model has been found, proceeds to apply it to the remaining cases with less details. I argue that this procedure, although it runs counters to the intuition that one ought to start with the most simple case, corresponds to a general scientific method. Consequently, most of Aristotle’s botany is found to be already encapsulated in the main results of his study of animals. (shrink)

Analysis and critical study of all the occurrences of ousia, eidos, morphè in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia.

This book is the first study of Aristotle s theory of generation and its revival by Averroes. For the first time, major treatises by Averroes on the physics, theory of elements, and biology of Aristotle are considered in their mutual relationship and in their connection to metaphysics. This study reveals issues at the foundation of Averroes philosophy and reinterprets them as fundamental milestones in the history of philosophy.".

Nearly fifteen years ago Nicev published a study entitled L'Enigme de La Catharsis Tragique dans Aristote, in which he argued for a new interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of tragic catharsis. This interpretation has, I believe, an important kernel of truth in it, although it is based on an eccentric and unpersuasive interpretation of Poetics 1452a1-11. It suggests that for Aristotle catharsis is the act of purging the audience of a false opinion concerning the apparent innocence of the hero and (...) of purging that audience of a directly related false opinion concerning the apparently arbitrarily unjust action of the divine forces which bring the hero to ruin. (shrink)

Aristote attribue à la poésie la faculté de représenter la réalité par l'intermédiaire du récit: on comprend le monde en le racontant. Cette doctrine a été reçue, modifiée, pliée à de nouvelles exigences au cours des siècles. Comment les préoccupations de l'Antiquité ont-elles survécu à l'âge moderne?

The paper reconsiders Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic forms as causes together with its wider implications for the differences but also similiarities between the two philosophers. Analyzing the relevant texts of Metaphysics A 9 and Generation and Corruption II, 9, where Aristotle addresses the hypothesis of forms as put forward in the Phaedo, it discusses two interpretative options : that Aristotle takes these forms for an imperfect anticipation of formal causes, and that he sees them as an aborted attempt at grasping (...) the efficient causation whose proper discovery Aristotle claims to be uniquely his own. Although both readings have their virtues and can be defended from the Aristotelian perspective, their check against the text of the Phaedo reveals that, in this context, efficient causation distinct from material causation is quite plausibly the issue Aristotle has in mind first and foremost. This, however, is only one side of Aristotle’s broader critical stance towards forms as causes : while he seems to detect a split in Plato’s own understanding of the relation between the forms and causation, he is equally critical of the craft-like model as personified by the demiurge of the Timaeus. However, other passages from the Metaphysics suggest that some features of precisely this model, once it is carefully stripped of its personal aspect, may ultimately bear on Aristotle’s own conception of efficient cause. (shrink)

Excerpt from La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées Et des Nombres d'Après Aristote: Étude Historique Et Critique La théorie phtonioionno de l'amour. Vol. Ia-8 de la Collection historique des grands philosophes 3 fr. 75. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the (...) aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an overall (...) interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of the “Third Man” argument. (shrink)

Partant du constat qu’il existe à la fois une très grande similitude entre les philosophies de la perception d’Aristote et de Merleau-Ponty, et une revendication de ce dernier de s’affranchir du cadre ontologique hérité, cet article cherche à définir où se situe exactement la différence entre les deux conceptions. Il écarte d’abord l’hypothèse d’une assimilation ontologique totale entre sentant et sensible dans l’indistinction de la chair, dans la mesure où ce tissu n’est pas un uniforme mais peut toujours présenter la (...) dualité adhérente de l’envers et de l’endroit. Ensuite se pose la question de savoir si la Visibilité en général, comme puissance indéterminée, était impensable pour Aristote en raison de sa théorie de la substance – et il est montré que celle-ci, bien comprise, admet la pure puissance, tout en favorisant la détermination. Dès lors, la différence entre les deux auteurs se manifeste plutôt dans la conception de l’être, qui pour Merleau-Ponty demeure en retrait, tandis que pour Aristote il est toujours a priori déterminable, quoique selon des modalités irréductiblement multiples.Starting from the observation that there is at once a great similarity between the perception philosophy of Aristotle and Merleau-Ponty, and a claiming from the latter to emancipate oneself from the inherited ontological frame, this article tries to define where exactly stands the difference between the two conceptions. It first dismisses the hypothesis of a complete ontological assimilation between perceptive and perceptible in the indistinction of the « flesh », as far as this « web » is not a uniform but can always produce the adhering duality of inside and outside. Then comes the question whether the general Visibility, as indeterminable potency, was unthinkable by Aristotle because of his substance theory – and it is showed that this theory, if well understood, admits the pure potency even favouring the determination. Finally, the difference between the two thinkers appears rather in the conception of Being, that, according to Merleau-Ponty, stands in the background, while, according to Aristotle, it is always a priori determinable although in irreducibly multiple modes. (shrink)